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Abstract
This article puts forward the fundamental lines of thought on the Political Economy of 
Communications and the Media, since the development of capitalism up to the present 
day. Clarifying the distinction between Economy and Political Economy, this work 
examines the central split between two traditions within Political Economy: the Classic 
approach which is centred on markets and competition mechanisms and the Critical 
approach which is centred on the analysis of property and the distribution of power 
in society. Despite internal distinct traditions, for political economists’ questions about 
cultural production and consumption are never simply matters of economic organi-
sation or creative expression and the relations between them. They are always also 
questions about the organisation of power and its consequences for the constitution of 
public life. Based on different Political Economy perspectives, this article attempts to 
present the most recent developments on communications and media markets in Europe 
and the major challenges and opportunities the discipline faces in a time marked by the 
emergence of a digital public sphere. 
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Europe is the birth place of political economy. Its defining preoccupations emerged as 
part of a wider attempt to develop analytical accounts of societies transformed by the 
complex knot of changes that were forging a distinctively ‘modern’ world, both insti-
tutionally and ideologically. The rise of capitalism lay at the heart of these continental 
shifts. From his position as the Commissioner of the Customs and Salt Duties for 
Scotland, where he was centrally concerned with the trans-national flow of commodi-
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ties, Adam Smith’s eye was caught by the European commercial empires operated by 
the state licensed private monopolies of the English and Dutch East India Companies, 
which he saw as restricting trade. In response he wrote his best known book, The 
Wealth of Nations, arguing passionately for modern economic life to be based on 
‘free’ markets in which anyone wishing to do business could enter the sphere of com-
merce without restraint and compete to satisfy the demands and desires of customers 
at prices they were willing to pay. 
Seventy years later, Karl Marx, exiled in London, still at the time the world’s great-
est trading port, looked out on an economic landscape transformed by the relentless 
rise of factory production. His grasp of the centrality of industrialisation was given 
added impetus by his friendship and collaboration with Frederick Engels whose fam-
ily owned a factory in the northern city of Manchester, one of the central hubs of 
the new capitalism. Where Smith had seen markets as the least worst mechanism for 
allocating productive resources and matching supply to demand, Marx pointed to the 
systematic exploitation of labour beneath the appearance of equality of exchange and 
fair dealing. Behind the dazzlingly lit displays of fashions and consumer goods in the 
new shopping arcades and stores he saw the dirty realities of indentured labour in the 
colonies and sweat shops in the back streets of the metropolis. 
This central split between those analyses which start from markets and competition 
and those that start with the ownership key productive resources and control over the 
production process, often characterised as a division between Classical and Critical 
approaches, continues to run through contemporary political economy. Indeed, the 
world wide romance with markets over the last decades has sharpened it. 
The new capitalism that Marx confronted was marked by the reorganisation of pro-
duction around industrialisation, identified with the mass production of standardised 
commodities in regimented factories, and the reorganisation of consumption around 
commercialism, identified with the promotion of goods which had been expressly 
designed to fit with already established popular tastes in order to maximise sales. 
Cultural critics of the time were alarmed to see communications goods being rapidly 
subjected to these same processes. Underlying much of this concern was a romantic 
conception of the ‘true’ artist or author as a figure driven by inner conviction and often 
at odds with ruling ideas and prevailing tastes. In an age where organised religion was 
steadily loosing its purchase on the popular imagination, especially in the de ritualised 
climes of Protestant Northern Europe, many observers saw ‘art’ as the best chance of 
transcending the standardising logics of industrialisation and commercialism, ensur-
ing the survival of alternative ways of thinking, looking, listening and feeling, and 
just possibly, affording a glimpse of the sublime. In this conception artists always 
appear as members of an avant garde, able to see through the lies of the powerful 
and the taken-for-granted routines of everyday life and penetrate to the deeper truths 
concealed behind. In contrast to this elevated ideal, routine workers in the emerging 
cultural industries inevitably appeared as hacks, turning out material to order, tailored 
to the tastes of the growing mass market of factory and office workers hungry for 
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entertainment and distraction. Accordingly, they were roundly condemned for taking 
the capitalist shilling and trading in trivia and sensation. This romantic conception of 
the artist was shared by both radical and conservative critics. Marx, who had wooed 
his future wife Jenny, with self-penned poetry was in no doubt that “Milton Produced 
Paradise Lost for the same reason that a silk-worm produces silk. It was an activity 
of his nature. Later he sold the product for £5. But the literary proletarian of Leipzig, 
who fabricates a books under the direction of his publisher…his product is from the 
outset subsumed under capital, and comes into being only for the purpose of increas-
ing that capital” (Marx, 1969: 401). Proof that industrial serial production aimed 
at the commercial mass market. Squeezed out diversity of expression was readily to 
hand. Between 1860 and 1890, the American dime-novel publisher, Irwin P Beadle & 
Co released some 3,000 titles, at an average rate of one every two and half weeks. By 
“offering the public more of the same, but not exactly” they combined the pleasures 
of familiarity with a particular genre (westerns, detective novels, romances) with the 
variations of novelty (the cowboy hero might fight a corrupt sheriff rather than cattle 
rustlers) (see Sassoon, 2002:118) This marketing strategy of repeating with variations, 
what had worked before was later adopted as the universal template for production in 
the emerging industries of popular music and popular film and later still, commercial 
radio and television. 
However, as the prefix ‘political’ makes clear, for political economists’ questions 
about cultural production and consumption are never simply a matters of economic 
organisation or creative expression and the relations between them. They are always 
also questions about the organisation of power and its consequences for the constitu-
tion of public life. The modern discipline of economics, which emerged at the turn of 
the twentieth century in a self conscious effort to depoliticise the study of economic 
life and establish a new ‘science’ focuses on the efficient working of ‘the economy’ as a 
bounded institutional domain. Against this, both classical and critical political econo-
mists are interested in the relations between the production and circulation of goods 
and the constitution of the good society. 
This concern has been fundamentally shaped by the shift in the political sphere 
that accompanies the rise of industrial capitalism. The Wealth of Nations was first 
published in 1776, the year of the American Revolution. Marx and Engels drafted 
The Communist Manifesto in 1848 as country after country in Europe experienced 
disruptions and insurgencies. People were forcing themselves onto the political stage. 
They were rejecting their assigned role as spectators of rituals mounted by princes, 
kings and emperors and claiming the right to participate fully in public life and to 
contribute to shaping its future forms. They were refusing to be subjects, subjected 
to forms of authority over which they had no control, and demanding to be treated 
as citizens with the right to elect the representatives who would make the laws under 
which they would consent to be governed. This transition from autocracy and absolut-
ism in Europe proceeded unevenly from country and country and across social groups, 
with the right to vote coming considerably later for women than for men. It was also 
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arrested and suspended by the rise of new forms of autocracy – single party states, 
military dictatorships – and the emergence of Fascism but as an ideal it was fiercely 
defended an fought for. 
For free market enthusiasts the coupling of advanced capitalism with mass democ-
racy did not present a problem since they defined a good society as one that maximised 
freedom of personal choice and they saw market mechanism as the best guarantor of 
the information, open debate, and diversity of ideas and argument that political deliber-
ation within mass democracies required. They concede that ‘market failures’ are likely 
to occur when the requirements of democracy run counter to the logic of profit max-
imisation governing corporate decision making but they see these as easily addressed 
by minor, remedial, public investment in supplementary forms of cultural production. 
In 1986, for example, a Committee appointed by the then Conservative Government 
in Britain to report of the future financing of the BBC and chaired by a convinced 
free-market economist, Sir Alan Peacock, argued that “there will always be a need to 
supplement the direct consumer market by public finance for programmes of a public 
service kind supported by people in their capacity as citizens and voters but unlikely 
to be commercially self-supporting in the view of broadcasting entrepreneurs” (Home 
Office, 1986: 133). The aim however was to fill these gaps with the absolute mini-
mum of public funding. Their solution was to propose that the compulsory licence fee 
which funded the BBC should be abolished, that all the Corporation’s services should 
be converted to subscription channels, and that a modest public fund be established to 
support worthy projects proposed by programme makers. Interestingly, they rejected 
calls for the BBC to be funded out of advertising sales on the strict free market grounds 
that advertising interferes with the proper, direct, relation between buyers and sellers, 
and elevates the requirement of advertisers (for audiences of a particular size and social 
composition) over the preferences of audiences. 
In contrast, critical political economists identify the mismatch between capitalism 
and democracy as both fundamental and structural. For them the fact that core cultural 
and communicative facilities – newspaper offices, film and recording studios, book 
publishing companies, television channels – are privately owned by shareholders whose 
major interest is maximising the return of their investment or advancing their own 
economic or political ambitions necessarily privileges personal interests over the public 
interest. They also reject the undue influence on public culture exercised by capitalists in 
their role as advertisers on the grounds that it gives undue prominence to one particular 
ways of talking about the world-commercial speech and squeezes the space available to 
other voices and perspectives. This leads them to argue for extensive public regulation 
of corporate behaviour to curb abuses of owner and advertiser power coupled with 
major investment in public cultural and communication facilities designed to provide 
everyone with the full range of symbolic resources required by participatory citizenship 
without falling back on either advertising support or additional payments at the point 
of use. By linking access to cultural and communications goods directly to ability to pay 
the price mechanism inevitably creates sharp differentials in access. Funding produc-
comunicação e sociedade 7.indd 02-08-2005, 17:3614
Graham Murdock l Continental shifts: capitalism, communications and change in Europe 15
tion and distribution out of taxation goes some way to equalising them. Where market 
thinking fixes on the figure of the individual consumer making choices in the media 
marketplace, critical perspectives focus on meeting the communicative requirements of 
people in their role as citizens participating in a moral and political community. 
Looking back to the development of critical political economy perspectives and 
their application to issues of culture and communication we can see that research 
and argument quickly came to focus on three key areas; the power of capital to 
determine the shape of public culture; the industrialisation of cultural production 
and its consequences for diversity and originality of expression; and the proper role 
of public regulation and subsidy. These core issues remain central to present debates 
in Europe but the terms of argument are continually shifting in response to changes 
in the media environment produced by a combination of technological innovations, 
corporate strategies, and national and EU policy responses. Underlying these move-
ments is a widespread disillusion with traditional models of public intervention and 
a fundamental institutional and ideological shift in favour of private enterprise and 
market dynamics. 
Redefining the ‘Cultural Industries’
The term ‘culture industry’ was first proposed in 1944, by Max Horkheimer and 
Theodore Adorno, the leading figures in the group of Marxist intellectuals and cul-
tural analysts grouped around a research institute based in Frankfurt. With Hitler’s 
consolidation of power both men moved to the United States where they observed at 
first hand the continuous flow of popular movies and music that filled cinemas across 
the country and competed for a place in the weekly ‘hit parade’. This confirmed them 
in their conviction that under the conditions of advanced capitalism cultural produc-
tion aimed at the heartland of public culture would be overwhelmingly characterised 
by industrialisation and the radical curtailment of expressive diversity and experiment. 
For them, the relentless “assembly-line character of the culture industry, the synthetic, 
planned method of turning out its products” constructed a machine that “rotates on 
the same spot” in which the constant search for novelty and surprise disguises a deeply 
conservative system which “excludes the untried as a risk” and concentrates on “want 
is taken for granted but has never existed” (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1973: 163/134). 
Commentators have quarrelled with their romantic view that ‘true’ art can only be 
produced by inner-directed individuals and their consequent denial of the collective 
labour involved in much ‘high’ cultural production. But they have wanted to hold on 
to their central notion that the more culture becomes an industry like any other the 
less hospitable it is likely to be to projects that disrupt and challenge received ideas 
and established tastes. 
From the 1970s onwards however, the term ‘culture industry’ has been progres-
sively emptied of its critical content and assimilated into official policy discourse. 
Faced with the rapid decline of the traditional manufacturing industries that drove the 
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‘first’ industrial revolution governments in Europe and elsewhere have cast around for 
economic sectors that might provide the hub for a ‘second’ economic revolution .”If 
the industrial era was characterized by the amassing of physical capital and property” 
so the argument runs, “the new era prizes intangible forms of power bound up in bun-
dles of information and intellectual assets” and in command over creativity (Rifkin, 
2000: 30). In line with this view of change, the term ‘culture industry’ ceases to oper-
ate as a rhetoric identifying the antagonistic relation between cultural diversity, and 
industrialised production and commercial distribution and becomes a shorthand for a 
cluster of industries moving towards the centre of a new, ‘weightless’, economy. Worry 
over the plight of the creative artist is replaced by a concern with how best to promote 
those industries that depend on continuous creative work in order to make an impact 
in the global marketplace. No matter that this ‘creativity’ may consist of tweaking a 
well established generic formula or television programme format or devising more 
effective marketing strategies. “By calling something a ‘culture industry’ or ‘creative’ 
industry” this new policy rhetoric effortlessly superimposes aesthetic value on market 
value (see Negus and Pickering, 2004: 51). 
Promoting marketisation
This convenient conflation is part of a more general marketisation of official policy 
and discourse. At the institutional level, marketisation entails a cluster of policy inter-
ventions designed to enlarge the playing fields open to private corporations, to increase 
their freedom of action, and to reduce the countervailing force exercised by publicly 
funded cultural organisations. At the ideological level it is marked by the installation 
of market criteria of performance as the yardsticks against which all institutions will 
be judged (including those still in the public sector) and the celebration of risk taking 
entrepreneurs and choice making consumers as the quintessential sovereign individu-
als of capitalism (see Murdock and Golding, 2001)
The rapid rise of marketisation since the mid 1970s marks a sharp break with the 
situation that obtained in most of (Western) Europe in the years following World War 
II. In contrast to the United States, where all key media facilities were privately owned 
from the outset and ‘public interest’ requirements were met through various forms of 
regulation, in most European countries the two facilities considered most central to 
an active social life and participatory citizenship – the telephone network and broad-
casting – were publicly owned and charged with making key communications and 
cultural resources available to everyone, without discrimination, and at a price that 
even the poorest household could afford. To this end the costs of local telephone class 
were cross-subsidised out of the profits made on long distance and international busi-
ness traffic and public call boxes were installed across the country for those without a 
domestic hand set. Public broadcasting was funded wholly or mainly out of taxation, 
charged with providing the cultural resources required for the full exercise of citizen-
ship, and required to offer the full range of services to everyone without additional 
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payment at the point of use. These mechanisms for ensuring universality of provision, 
and in the case of public broadcasting, diversity of expression and argument, were seen 
as essential to the proper functioning of complex democracies based on the ideal of 
universal participation. 
Marketisation has substantially dismantled this post-war settlement. This has been 
achieved through varying combinations of five major policy interventions; privatisa-
tion, liberalisation, commodification, the reorientation of public regulation, and cor-
poratisation (which will come to in the last section). 
Privatisation entails the transfer of publicly held assets to private investors and the 
conversion of organisations that were previously public utilities or corporations into 
profit seeking private companies. To date, with the notable exception of the major 
French channel TFI, almost no public broadcasting organisations in Western Europe 
have been fully privatised, though a number have sold off some of their assets. The 
BBC for example has divested itself of its transmitter network. In contrast, privati-
sation has become the norm in the telecommunications sector. Postal services have 
been separated from telephone and data networks and the old publicly owned PTT’s 
(post, telegraph and telephone utilities) have either been sold off or opened to outside 
investors. The result is a sea change in corporate culture, away from the provision 
of services in the public interest, and towards a concerted search for new investment 
opportunities and profit centres, including the provision of entertainment over new 
broadband networks. 
Liberalisation involves allowing new entrants to enter markets that were previ-
ously either monopolies or dominated by a handful of operators. In 1980, for exam-
ple, only two countries in Western Europe, Italy and Great Britain had dual television 
systems with public broadcasters competing against commercial channels. With the 
exception of Luxembourg that had always had a purely commercial system, in all the 
others public channels enjoyed a monopoly. Over the course of the next decade and 
half however their privileged position was increasingly undermined by the arrival of 
new commercial cable and satellite services and new terrestrially based channels sup-
ported by advertising. By the end of the 1990s, the age of monopoly was well and truly 
over and public broadcasters found themselves locked in an intensified competition for 
viewers’ interest and loyalty, and in a number of cases, for advertising revenues as well 
(see Siune and Hulten, 1998). One option was to play the commercial channels at their 
own game by concentrating prime-time programming on popular genres with known 
audience appeal. The resulting squeeze on ‘difficult’, contentious, or minority appeal 
programming such as investigative documentaries and one-off dramas prompted wide-
spread criticism among commentators who saw public broadcasting as an essential 
cultural resource for citizenship. They argued that the historic mission to enlighten and 
explain by linking biographies to histories was being ‘dumbed down’ , submerged in a 
sea of life style programmes, reality shows and talk shows that focused on individual 
choices and dilemmas detached from any attempt connect personal circumstances to 
social structures or policy options. 
comunicação e sociedade 7.indd 02-08-2005, 17:3617
Comunicação e Sociedade l Vol. 7 l 200518
Commodification. As well as effecting production strategies the enlargement of the 
market sphere in culture and communication has had a major impact on public access 
to key resources. By making access conditional on ability to pay it ensures that the 
exercise of cultural rights is directly regulated by the amount of disposable income that 
individuals and households can command. Domestic internet access is a case in point. 
At present this requires as a minimum, ownership of a desk top computer an access to 
a suitable a telecommunications link. However, in order to access the Internet flexibly 
and use its full range of possibilities (such as video streaming) users need to upgrade 
from a basic dial-up link to a broadband connection and to own a laptop machine that 
can take advantage of the wireless (wi-fi) connections now being installed in a vari-
ety of public locations. Both these additions are relatively expensive. Consequently, 
as Manuel Castells has noted, just as “the huddled masses finally have access to the 
phone-line Internet, the global elites will have already escaped into a higher circle of 
cyberspace” (Castells, 2001:256)
Re-orienting regulation. Historically one of the principle aims of European regula-
tion in the fields of communications and culture has been the defence of the ‘public 
interest’ in the sense of ensuring that commercial operators do not abuse their power 
and are required to provide resources for citizenship even when these are not profit-
able. The United Kingdom was the first country in Western Europe to allow commercial 
television companies to operate alongside the public broadcaster, the BBC. However, 
from the outset strict limits were placed on ownership (companies could only own one 
regional franchise) and on the amount and type of advertising permitted (with a ban on 
programme sponsorship). Companies were also required to produce a range of ‘pub-
lic service’ programmes even though they would attract smaller audiences than more 
immediately popular offering in the same slot in the schedule. These included: regional 
news, religious programmes, documentaries on current issues, and programmes for eth-
nic and other minorities, such as the profoundly deaf. Recent years however have seen a 
steady watering down this regulatory regime. Mergers have been sanctioned which now 
leave the whole of England served by one consolidated company. The rules governing 
advertising have been relaxed to allow extensive programme sponsorship. And there 
are constant calls from the commercial operators for the public service obligations to be 
removed so that they can compete more effectively with cable and satellite services. This 
retreat from public service regulation, as it has been traditionally understood, is fully 
in line with the new thinking at European level. In the era of open markets, the public 
good can be best guaranteed by a regulatory system focused on fair competition and 
consumer protection. As Philip Lowe, European Commission’s Director General for 
Competition told a recent gathering of communications professionals; “the emphasis 
of regulation has shifted away from protection of some broadly defined ‘public interest’ 
towards opening up markets, ensuring free and fair competition between producers 
and promoting the interests of consumers” (Lowe, 2004:1). In this conception, public 
regulation is a last resort, to be mobilised only when Adam’s Smith’s ‘hidden hand’ 
of market dynamics has singularly failed to stop dominant companies abusing their 
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power to rig markets in their favour, overcharging their customers, or selling them 
shoddy goods. Even these modest aims are subject to revision however, when wider 
economic or political interests intervene. 
Unshackling capital
Critical political economy’s long standing concern over the potential for abuses of 
power conferred by the private ownership of public media have been forcefully under-
lined by the activities of two of the major media moguls now operating in Europe: 
Rupert Murdoch and Silvio Berlusconi. 
Murdoch’s ownership of The Sun, Britain’s best sold daily newspaper and one of the 
most successful tabloids in the world, has made him a political player to reckon with. 
Successive British governments, both Conservative and Labour, have convinced them-
selves that their possibilities of being elected or re-elected will be seriously damaged, 
possibly beyond repair, if they do not have the support of The Sun. This was one of 
the main considerations behind the Thatcher Government’s decision not to intervene 
when Murdoch’s fledgling UK satellite television service, Sky, took over its only rival. 
This conferral of a de-facto monopoly gave Murdoch an unchallenged base on which 
he was able to build an enterprise, now called BskyB, that is the major commercial 
competitor to the BBC in the emerging multi-channel television. He has also benefited 
from the more relaxed regulatory regime at European level which by sanctioning the 
merger between his holding company, News Corporation, and the Italian satellite 
service Telepiu has allowed him to launch Sky Italia as the major player in the Italian 
satellite television market. 
Italy also provides the most dramatic contemporary instance of the potential 
abuses accruing to owner power. Silvio Berlusconi is a long standing fear made flesh. 
He exploits a loophole in the Italian regulations barring the establishment of national 
commercial television services to construct three networks with national reach. He 
mobilises these networks, together with his extensive press interests, to create and pro-
mote a new political party, Forza Italia, building a momentum that elects him to the 
highest political position in the land. He is forced to leave office but is later re-elected 
for a second time promising to separate himself from his media holdings to avoid con-
flicts of interest. He fails to do so and repeatedly uses his media interests to attack his 
opponents and defend his decisions to introduce new laws designed to protect his per-
sonal interests and give him immunity from prosecution on various criminal charges. 
To further reduce the spaces available for critique and opposition he sets about incor-
porating the public broadcaster RAI into his orbit of influence. 
Berlusconi is an extreme case of course, but his career reveals a wider logic that 
Jürgen Habermas dubbed ‘refeudalisation’ and which he saw as the primary force 
undermining the vitality of the public sphere. It is a striking metaphor and one that 
points to perhaps the most important consequence of marketisation. Just when they 
have finally obtained the right to full citizenship people are being returned to the status 
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of subjects, subjected to the power of media barons who behave like feudal overlords 
and enveloped in the rhetorical orthodoxy of market discourse promoted with the 
same evangelical vigour that Catholic missionaries brought to spreading the Gospel. 
This new religion offers its own potent vision of salvation. Dedicated consumption 
is all that is acquired, allowing the healing touch of commodities to re-make the self, 
abolishing bodily blemishes, ugly homes, and daily drudgery, with cosmetics, stylish 
interiors, and high performance cars. 
Reconstructing the public sphere
Against this radical privatisation of personal fate, Habermas proposes a vision of col-
lective cultural space as a public sphere in which people come together to deliberate on 
issues of shared concern and try to forge a provisional agreement on what collective 
action should be taken. He sees this sphere emerging in the great European commercial 
cities of the late Eighteenth century and finding its major forms in coffee-house debates 
and the emerging newspaper press. Alongside this ‘political public sphere’ devoted to 
issues requiring policy decisions, he identifies a parallel ‘literary public sphere’, centred 
on the other great medium of the time – the novel – and concerned with exploring what 
it means to be human and how it feels to walk in another person’s shoes. This cultural 
resource, though not directly related to the exercise of citizenship in the narrow sense 
of participation in the democratic process, is essential to fostering the empathy and 
openness to difference required by deliberation in a complex society. 
The history of public broadcasting can be read in part as a history of successive 
attempts to translate these two idealised public spheres into cultural forms that allow 
people to discover things about themselves and the world around them that they might 
otherwise have missed and to enter into debates on possible futures having posses-
sion of comprehensive and disinterested information and access to the widest possible 
range of analysis, interpretation, and explanation. However, these aims can only be 
achieved, so supporters argue, if public service institutions are relatively independent 
of undue influence from both the state and the government of the day and the pres-
sures of market competition. Over the last two decades this principle of keeping com-
merce at arm’s length has been steadily eroded by corporatisation. 
This entails governments requiring or cajoling public institutions to act more and 
more as though they were commercial companies. This aim can be achieved in a vari-
ety of ways. 
Public subsidies can be cut, forcing public institutions to look for additional 
sources of income. Accepting advertising, seeking commercial sponsorship, and charg-
ing users for services that were previously free, are the most obvious options and have 
been mobilised in varying combinations by a wide range of public institutions from 
museums and schools to public broadcasters. 
At the same time, governments may seek to exploit the positive brand identity of 
major public institutions by nominating them as ‘national champions’ that can com-
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pete effectively in the international marketplace. This policy has been vigorously pur-
sued by the British Government in relation to the BBC. As a consequence the Corpo-
ration’s commercial arm, BBC World, has entered into a series of co-production agree-
ments with major American programme makers, aggressively marketed the formats to 
a range of its high rating shows, and devised an expanding range of merchandise based 
on its programmes, from books and videotapes to children’s toys. 
The outcomes have been contradictory. On the one hand these initiatives have 
gone some way towards fulfilling their stated ambition of raising additional revenues 
to finance domestic programme production and support innovation and experiment. 
On the other hand by introducing commercial calculations into programme planning 
they have helped shift the locus of decision making from commissioning editors and 
programme makers to marketing specialists and international partners tipping the bal-
ance away from the untried and risk and towards to the safe bet. 
This retreat from experimentation has been given an extra push by the rapid casu-
alisation of the creative labour force and the greater proportion of projects allocated to 
‘independent’ production companies. As Joan Bakewell, a leading presenter of one of 
the BBC’s best known cultural programmes of the 1970s, Late Night Line Up, recently 
remarked, television toady has “become and industry where loyalty to a single lifelong 
employed and identification with its aims has given way to a ladder of personal ambi-
tion [and as] more television people move from one independent company to another. 
They pick up the small change of television style and presentation. Programmes come 
to look more alike” (Bakewell, 2003: 306). The result is industrialisation without fac-
tories, standardisation as a routine reflex. 
Paradoxically however, the shift from analogue to digital technologies within the 
broadcasting industry has the potential to interrupt this unimpeded migration towards 
the market. At first sight this look unlikely. The proliferation of new channels made 
possible by the compression of spectrum space and the installation of new ‘fat’ cable 
networks is subjecting public service broadcasters to even more intense competition 
for viewers and reinforcing calls for them to be confined to the museum of commu-
nications history on the grounds that everything they offer is now readily available 
either on cable and satellite services or over the Internet. This argument is superficially 
attractive but it ignores two key points. Firstly, public broadcasting differs fundamen-
tally from commercial channels offering ostensibly the same fare (such as programmes 
for children or sports fans) in not being interrupted by adverting and/or not requiring 
additional payments (in the form of subscriptions) as a condition of access. Secondly, as 
noted earlier, even convinced supporters of a free market in broadcast services concede 
that not all social constituencies will be adequately served by a system driven by profit 
seeking. They may be too small or too poor to merit attention. 
A more convincing case can be made for the Internet as a universal provider, 
catering to every possible interest and taste. Here again however enthusiasts ignore 
both the deep economic and social inequalities that still structure access and the Net’s 
tendency to radically deconstruct the public sphere. In common with multi-channel 
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television systems, the parcelling out of interests on the Internet, hollows out public 
life by making it possible for people to consume only what they already know they 
like and to speak only to those they know already share their tastes and opinions. Such 
fragmentation works powerfully against the formation of the new points of contact 
and communality that can support broadly based deliberation in search of solutions to 
emerging collective problems. 
In contrast, public broadcasting is in a unique position to facilitate these con-
nections and to provide the hub for a new digital public sphere. Firstly, it is already 
integrated into everyday life. It is familiar, accessible and continues to provide a 
shared point of reference. Secondly, the switch from analogue to digital technologies 
of production and reception offers an opportunity to integrate broadcasting with the 
internet in new ways. Thirdly, because public broadcasters still enjoy high levels of 
public trust they are well placed to become portals of choice, the first place people look 
to when surfing the net. Fourthly, and most importantly, current experiments already 
suggest eminently practical ways of breaking with the logic of marketisation and cre-
ating shared resources based on a revivified conception of public goods. The BBC‘s 
proposal to establish a Creative Archive is a particularly interesting case in point. The 
plan is to make all of the Corporation’s past programming that is not subject to non 
negotiable copyright constraints, freely available on-line for anyone to download and 
re-use as they wish, providing those uses are not for monetary gain. This principle of 
open access runs directly counter to the renewed emphasis on intellectual property 
and commodification that is so central to market thinking in the cultural sphere. Since 
the original productions were paid for out of public money, so the argument goes, the 
public already owns them collectively and should not be required to pay again on an 
individual basis. The potential uses of the Creative Archive are enormous but it is only 
one stand in a wider BBC strategy of integrating what appears on screen with what 
is available on-line. In this vision programmes cease to be self contained events and 
become jumping off points for a range of activities conducted on line, from following 
up additional information resources, to engaging in debate with programme makers 
and other members of the audience about the issues raised and making contact with 
movements and groups working in the same area. 
On the last page of his major book on the public sphere, originally published 
in 1962, Habermas holds out the hope that the struggle between critical and open 
deliberation and communication skilfully managed in the interests of corporate and 
governmental power “remains open” (Habermas, 1991). In the intervening years the 
relentless push towards marketisation has progressively closed this space down. In the 
coming decade the creation of new digital public sphere may go some way towards 
providing an alternative. Developing arguments and practical proposals that will 
facilitate this presents critical political economy with a major challenge, but also an 
unprecedented opportunity. 
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